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Criminal Penalties for Harassment
Everyone is harassed, annoyed, or alarmed to some degree at some time.
In certain instances, though, the harassment' is of such kind or frequency as
to cause a substantial interference with the victim's normal life. This occurs
when one person engages in a course of conduct which is intended to, or
which actually does, cause another person to become intimidated, fright-
ened, or alarmed to such an extent that emotional distress results.
Harassment can be regarded as a tortious intrusion of the victim's right to
privacy because the perpetrator of the harassment creates an unwarranted
interference with the victim's life. Harassing conduct may also fit within the
tort concept of intentional infliction of emotional distress if the perpetrator's
conduct is done with the intent of causing the victim to suffer severe
emotional distress. In these tort situations, the victim may bring suit against
the perpetrator for invasion of privacy or for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, seeking damages and/or a prohibitory injunction. These civil
remedies, however, do not provide the victim with any police protection,
nor are they always adequate to halt the harassment. In harassment cases,
the presence of strong emotions may render the legal process totally ineffec-
tive. 2 The perpetrator of the harassing conduct may be so set upon a course
of action that the threat of civil liability is disregarded.
In addition to tort remedies, seven states3 have enacted criminal harass-
ment statutes to protect the victim from the perpetrator's harassing conduct.
California, however, is among the majority of jurisdictions having no
criminal sanctions for harassment. Various related criminal statutes do
prohibit certain offenses against the person and against the public peace, but
harassment does not fall within the existing criminal definitions. Thus, in
the majority of states which have no criminal harassment statutes, harassing
conduct cannot be treated as a crime.
I. The dictionary definition of "harass" is "to vex, trouble, or annoy continually or
chronically." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICIONARY 1031 (3d ed. 1971).
2. See Sedler, Injunctive Relief and Personal Integrity, 9 ST. Louis L.J. 147, 166 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Sedler].
3. Arkansas, Colorado, Kentucky, Maine, New York, Oregon, and Pennsylvania. See
notes 144 and 147 infra.
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When the perpetrator's conduct harasses the victim so severely that the
victim suffers substantial emotional distress, there is an unwarranted inter-
ference with the victim's right to pursue and obtain safety, happiness and
privacy. 4 Harassment is not only an injury to an individual; the harm or
trauma is reflected upon society, and the public has an interest in protection
from this type of conduct. The strong public interest in protecting society
from the type of harm caused by harassment finds support in the guarantee
of privacy expressly granted by the California Constitution5 and implied in
the Federal Constitution. 6 Harassment is a blow to human dignity, demeans
the individual,7 and thus is socially intolerable conduct that should be
made subject to prosecution in the interest of the people of the state.
Harassment should be punishable as a crime, and this comment will
propose that California enact a criminal harassment statute. 8 A criminal
sanction is necessary due to the inadequacy of the civil remedies for
harassing conduct. To understand the availability and shortcomings of the
tort remedies, it is first necessary to discuss the type of conduct constituting
harassment. The public interest in preventing harassment will then be
explored, laying a foundation for the necessity of a criminal statute. The
criteria for examining a proposed statutory formulation will be established
by an analysis of the case law in the states that do have criminal harassment
statutes. This will lead to the proposition that a criminal harassment statute
be enacted in California.
The validity of a criminal harassment statute depends upon careful draft-
ing to avoid unconstitutional vagueness or overbreadth. A carelessly worded
statute could provide a vehicle for abuse; that is, a harassment statute could
itself be used as a tool for harassment.9 The statute must not proscribe
constitutionally protected speech, and must describe the type of conduct to
be prohibited with enough specificity so that a reasonable person will know
whether he or she is violating the law. In order to define the boundaries of
the conduct to be prohibited, it is necessary to describe exactly what conduct
constitutes harassment.
CoNDuCT CONSTITUTING HARASSMENT
In essence, harassment is an invasion of privacy causing the victim to
suffer emotional distress. No physical contact or assault is involved in
4. The right to pursue and obtain safety, happiness and privacy is expressly guaranteed
by the California Constitution. CAL. CoNsT. art. I, §. See notes 135 and 136 infra, and text
accompanying notes 135-143 infra.
5. CAL. CONST. art. I, §1.
6. See text accompanying notes 125-134 infra.
7. See Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser,
39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 962, 973 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Bloustein].
8. A proposed statute is contained in the text accompanying notes 250-56 infra.
9. Such abuse might occur through an individual initiating a prosecution for a petty or
minor annoyance, or a police officer making an on-the-spot arrest of a person acting in a rude or
offensive manner toward the officer. See text accompanying notes 207-223 infra.
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harassment alone; if there were, the conduct would be punishable under
existing criminal statutes. 0 In contrast with conduct disturbing the public
peace, harassment directly affects an individual rather than the community
at large.
A typical case of harassment occurs when the perpetrator continually
follows the victim, constantly sends letters and packages, makes incessant
telephone calls, and otherwise deluges the victim with unwanted attention. I
If this behavior continues for any length of time, the victim is likely to
become more than mildly irritated; he or she may become frightened, feel
threatened, and find it necessary to alter his or her lifestyle in an effort to
elude the perpetrator of the harassment.
A victim of a conscious process of intimidation is a victim of harass-
ment. 12 Intimidation may be even more damaging than an actual physical
assault. The results of one study showed that women who received anony-
mous, obscene, or threatening telephone calls exhibited more anxiety than
those who had been victims of serious physical assaults and thefts. 13 An
example of this type of intimidation is the case of a woman living in a
Chicago high-rise who received strange phone calls, odd gifts, and sexually
suggestive literature purportedly from a nonexistent foundation. It was
discovered that the source of this attention was a "peeping tom" in a nearby
high-rise who monitored the woman's private moves and let her know he
was doing so.
14
10. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §240 (assault); CAL. PENAL CODE §242 (battery). See also
notes 99 and 102 and accompanying text infra. Nor is California's' "peace bond" statute, CAL.
PENAL CODE §§701-714, an appropriate remedy for harassment. Use of this provision would
only be available if harassment were already codified as a crime, because a peace bond can only
be used to prevent threatened offenses. Even so, use of the peace bond statute would probably
not withstand judicial scrutiny due to the serious constitutional deficiencies of the statute. See
Truninger, Marital Violence, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 259, 266 (1971); Note, "Preventive Justice"--
Bonds to Keep the Peace and for Good Behavior, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 331 (1940).
11. An example of this type of conduct was reported in NEWSWEEK, July 4, 1977, at 59:
He followed her day after day, she remembers. He pressed his face against the
windows of her classrooms and peered at her around bookstacks in the library. He
swathed her car in red and white camellia blossoms. He called her 40 times a weekend
and sent her gifts such as his sterling-silver baby cup. . . .When she fled to her
parents' home 150 miles away, he would park nearby for hours. . . .[He] bombard-
ed her, she says, with clippings on parapsychology, letters he had written to President
Ford and gifts, including a rock shaped like a phallus.
12. Linda Douglass, a Los Angeles television newscaster, became a victim of this type of
harassment after doing a story on a state mental hospital. She received threatening telephone
calls, was followed in her car, and twice came home to find offensive words scrawled on her
door in red lipstick. Douglass had also been subjected to harassing conduct years earlier: first,
someone broke into her apartment and ripped up the magazines. Then later, in the course of
looking for her bathing suit, she came across her bikini bottoms which had been cut up iAto
small pieces and hidden under other clothing. Murphy, One Victim's Story, NEW WEST,
February 28, 1977, at 23-24.
13. This study was conducted by Albert Biderman, a sociologist and assistant director of
the Bureau of Social Science Research in Washington, D.C. He states, "The ambiguous threat
can be the most devastating of them all. You think someone is after you but you don't know
who it is or what they want. Fear of the unknown can freeze people's lives into a state of
terror." Garfinkel, Psychological Rape: New Terror for Women, NEW WEST, February 28,
1977, at 21-22.
14. In a news story reporting this case, a sociologist coined the term "psychological rape"
to describe this type of harassment. Garfinkel, Psychological Rape: New Terror for Women,
NEW WEST, February 28, 1977 at 21.
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Harassment does not always involve male victimization of women. The
perpetrator of the harassment may be male or female, and anyone-male or
female-may find him or herself the victim of harassment. In Webber v.
Gray15, the plaintiff was a man seeking an injunction to prevent the female
defendant from further humiliating, embarrassing, worrying, disturbing, and
injuring him in his social and business relations. Besides writing letters to
plaintiff and to plaintiff's wife, mother, and employer, the defendant
daily accosted plaintiff in the street, followed him to work, and left notes in
his car. Although this conduct may not have frightened or intimidated the
plaintiff, it was, sufficiently disrupting to his social and business life to
justify the granting of an injunction.16
The perpetrator of the harassing conduct may be acting out of any of a
variety of motives; he or she may be an overzealous creditor, 17 an ardent
suitor, a jilted lover, or a religious fanatic. The victim often does not know
why he or she is the target of such harassment, or how to defend against this
type of conduct. 18 If the perpetrator creates a substantial and unwarranted
interference with the victim's life, the victim is entitled to protection against
such an interference or compensation for the harm. One source of relief
from harassing conduct may be found in the tort remedies for invasion of
privacy or intentional infliction of emotional distress.
HARASSMENT AS A TORT
Because harassment is conduct by one individual causing harm to
another, traditional tort concepts may be employed to bring a civil suit
against the perpetrator of the harassment. A tort action against the perpe-
trator may be based either on invasion of privacy, or intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
A. Invasion of Privacy
California has recognized the right to privacy as the basis of a tort action
since 1931.19 The right was first acknowledged in the legal world, howev-
er, approximately 40 years earlier in 1890, when invasion of the right to
privacy was synthesized as an independent and distinct tort in Warren's and
Brandeis' classic law review article, The Right to Privacy.20 Since that
15. 228 Ark. 289, 307 S.W.2d 80 (1957).
16. Id. at 296, 307 S.W.2d at 84.
17. For examples of cases involving overzealous creditors, see Santiesteban v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1962); Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 Cal. App. 2d 793,216
P.2d 571 (1950); Note, Mental Distress from Collection Activities, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 369 (1965).
18. See note I 1 supra. "She had become a victim of sadistic harassment, and didn't know
why, or how to defend herself." Murphy, One Victim's Story, NEw WEST, February 28, 1977,
at 23,24.
19. Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
20. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890). Two years
earlier, however, Judge Cooley had discussed "the right to be let alone" in relation to assault
and the right to be free from threats or attempts of physical violence. T. COOLEY, TORTS 29 (2d
ed. 1888).
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time, nearly all American jurisdictions have recognized an invasion of
privacy as the basis for a tort action.
21
The development of the tort concept of privacy has not been orderly or
well-defined. In 1960, in an attempt to clarify this area of law, Dean Prosser
analyzed approximately 400 cases on privacy and delineated four categories
into which they could all be placed: intrusion, public disclosure of private
facts, false light in the public eye, and appropriation.
22
The basis of the action in harassment cases falls under Prosser's first
category-the plaintiff's interest against intrusion upon his or her solitude or
seclusion. Intrusion has been defined as conduct causing mental suffering,
shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities. 23 For example, in
the case of Nader v. General Motors Corp. ,24 a cause of action was held to
exist where the plaintiff, consumer advocate Ralph Nader, alleged that the
defendant corporation had caused him to be shadowed, wiretapped, and
eavesdropped upon, and that the defendant indiscriminately interviewed
third persons about features of Nader's intimate life, pried into his bank
accounts and taxes, caused him to be accosted by young women, and caused
him to receive threatening telephone calls. 25 An action against this type of
intrusion "represents a vindication of the right of private personality and
emotional security, the essence of the interest protected being aptly sum-
marized in Judge Cooley's perceptive phrase, 'the right to be left alone.'
26
California courts have not expressly recognized intrusion as a basis for a
cause of action under the tort of invasion of privacy. Case law indicates,
however, that an extension of the tort of privacy to instances of intrusion will
be approved. 27 The protected interest in intrusion cases is primarily mental.
28
Harassing conduct causes mental or emotional distress, and thus harassment
is a violation of this protected interest, giving rise to a cause of action for
21. Only Nebraska, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin still expressly reject the privacy action,
with the cases suggesting that the initiative for granting the right lies with the legislature and not
the courts. Brunson v. Ranks Army Store, 161 Neb. 519, 73 N.W.2d 803 (1955), followed in
Carson v. National Bank of Commerce Trust & Sav., 356 F. Supp. 811 (D.-Neb. 1973); Henry v.
Cherry & Webb, 30 R.I. 13, 73 A. 97 (1909), followed in Gravina v. Brunswick Corp., 338 F.
Supp. 1 (D.R.I. 1972); Yoeckel v. Samonig, 272 Wis. 430, 75 N.W.2d 925 (1956).
22. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960). Prosser lists the four categories as:
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs.
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff.
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye.
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or like-
ness.
Id. at 389.
23. See, e.g., Norris v. Moskin, 272 Ala. 174, 177, 132 So. 2d 321, 323 (1961) (unreason-
able debt collection); LeCrone v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 120 Ohio App. 129, 131, 201 N.E.2d 533,
536 (1963) (eavesdropping). See generally Comment, The Emerging Tort of Intrusion, 55 IOWA
L. REV. 718 (1970).
24. 31 App. Div. 2d 392, 298 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1969).
25. Id. at 394, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 139.
26. Id., quoting from Afro-Am. Pub. Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 653-54 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
27. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971). See also Note, Invasion of
Privacy by Intrusion: Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 6 Loy. L. REv. 200 (1973).
28. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv, 383, 392 (1960).
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invasion of privacy. As will be discussed later, though, the relief granted is
often inadequate to compensate the victim or stop the harassment.
29
B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
As an alternative to a tort action based on privacy, a victim of harassment
may seek relief by bringing suit for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 30 Establishing a cause of action for this tort is, however, more
difficult than for invasion of privacy. 31 For the latter, plaintiff need only
show that the intrusion was unreasonable and would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person. 32 But to establish a cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must show that the defendant
intended33 to cause the plaintiff to suffer mental distress and that the plaintiff
did in fact suffer severe emotional distress.
34
Until 30 years ago, no recovery wag allowed for intentional infliction of
emotional distress unless there was a resulting physical injury or illness. 35 A
growing body of case law to the contrary 36 prompted the amendment of the
Restatement of Torts in 1947 to provide that one may be liable for intention-
ally causing severe emotional distress to another, and damages for such
emotional distress may be recovered alone or in addition to damages for
bodily harm resulting from the distress. 37 Following this trend, the Califor-
nia courts in 1952 extended the right of recovery to situations in which no
physical injury resulted from the mental distress. 3s In response to conten-
tions that the door would now be open to unfounded claims and a flood of
litigation, the court in State Rubbish Collectors Association v. Siliznoff39
pointed out that jurors are more capable of determining whether a plaintiff
29. See text accompanying notes 51-105 infra.
30. See generally Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49
HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1936); Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 40 (1956); Prosser,
Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MIcH. L. REV. 874 (1939).
31. Greenawalt, New York's Right of Privacy-The Need for Change, 42 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 159, 175 (1975).
32. See Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 229, 253 P.2d 441, 444 (1953).
33. Or recklessly disregarded the possibility of causing the plaintiff to suffer mental
distress. See text accompanying note 50 infra.
34. Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 394, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 88
(1970).
35. The position of the Restatement of Torts in 1934 was as follows:
The interest in mental and emotional tranquility and, therefore, in freedom from
mental and emotional disturbances is not, as a thing in itself, regarded as of sufficient
importance to require others to refrain from conduct intended or recognizably likely
to cause such a disturbance.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §46, comment c. (1934).
36. See Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 40, 53 (1956), and cases cited
therein at n.77.
37. The amendment to the Restatement provided that, "The interest in freedom from
severe emotional distress is regarded as of sufficient importance to require others to refrain
from conduct intended to invade it." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §46, comment d (Supp. 1948).
38. State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952). In this
case, the plaintiff had experienced extreme fear following coercive threats from an association
of rubbish collectors demanding that plaintiff pay over proceeds he had made from the
association's territory. Id. at 335, 240 P.2d at 284.
39. Id.
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has suffered mental distress than they are of determining whether physical
injury has resulted. 4°
The Restatement of Torts states that recovery for intentional infliction of
emotional distress is allowed only where the conduct has been so outrageous
and extreme as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and is regarded
as atrocious and intolerable.41 The requisite emotional distress may consist
of any highly unpleasant mental reaction such as fright, horror, grief,
shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, wor-
ry, or nausea.
42
In California, though, the trend has been to require a lesser degree of
distress than indicated by the Restatement. 43 In Fletcher v. Western Nation-
al Life Insurance Co. ,I the defendant had engaged in conduct to induce the
plaintiff to surrender his insurance policy or enter into a disadvantageous
settlement. The plaintiff alleged that he was frightened and upset by the
defendant's misrepresentations, and was worried and anxious about losing
his home.45 The court agreed with the jury's determination that emotional
distress of the requisite severity existed, even though the court defined
severe emotional distress as "distress of such substantial quantity or endur-
ing quality that no reasonable man in a civilized society should be expected
to endure it.' "46 Similarly, a cause of action was found to exist in Golden v.
Dungan47 where the plaintiffs became frightened, upset, nervous, and
humiliated because defendants served process on them at midnight in a loud
and boisterous manner. 48 Thus, it would seem that conduct constituting
harassment would certainly be sufficient grounds to bring suit for intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
In addition to the requirement of extreme and outrageous conduct causing
severe emotional distress, the defendant's conduct must be carried out with
the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing,
the distress; and the defendant's outrageous conduct must be the actual and
proximate cause of the plaintiff's emotional distress. 49 If the defendant was
harassing the plaintiff without a specific intent to cause emotional distress,
40. Id. at 338, 240 P.2d at 286:
From their own experience jurors are aware of the extent and character of the
disagreeable emotions that may result from the defendant's conduct, but a difficult
medical question is presented when it must be determined if emotional distress
resulted in physical injury.
Id.
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §46, comment d (1965).
42. Id. at comment j.
43. Newby v. Alto Riviera Apartments, 60 Cal. App. 3d 288, 298, 131 Cal. Rptr. 547, 554
(1976).
44. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
45. Id. at 397-98, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
46. Id. at 397, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
47. 20 Cal. App. 3d 295, 97 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1971).
48. Id. at 310, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 587.
49. Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 394, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 88
(1970).
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the defendant may still be liable if his or her mental state falls within the
category of "reckless disregard." The California courts rely on the defini-
tion of reckless disregard set forth in the Restatement of Torts: one acts with
reckless disregard when he or she knows that such distress is certain, or
substantially certain, to result from his or her conduct. 50 Even if all of these
requirements are met and the plaintiff prevails, the available tort remedies
may nevertheless not afford relief, or may come too late to protect the
plaintiff.
C. Shortcomings of the Tort Remedies
When seeking relief from harassment under the tort theories of invasion
of privacy51 or intentional infliction of emotional distress, 52 harassment is
categorized as a "dignitary" harm. Dignitary torts are those that are primar-
ily concerned with harm to intangible values such as peace of mind or
personal integrity, rather than pecuniary or physical harm, and involve a
recognition of the value of emotional tranquility. 53 Unlike many other torts,
the harm caused in dignitary torts cannot be repaired or made whole by
money damages.54 The legal remedy merely represents a social vindication
of the human spirit rather than compensation for the loss suffered.5 5 Al-
though the difficulty of computing damages does not preclude recovery,
56 it
is doubtful that monetary compensation could ever be a sufficient remedy
for a dignitary harm.57 The potential liability of incurring a judgment for
money damages would not be an effective deterrent against harassment if
the perpetrator is seriously determined to carry out his or her course of
conduct. 58 If this is the case, the plaintiff may look to a civil remedy other
than money damages.
In cases involving dignitary harm caused by harassment, it would seem
proper to grant the victim equitable relief in the form of a prohibitory
injunction to prevent further harassment. Aside from the common problem
that most people do not have the time or money to pursue a civil remedy,
even an injunction is inadequate relief from harassment because of the
difficulties in obtaining and enforcing injunctions.5 9 Perhaps more im-
portantly, no police protection is available to a victim of harassment while a
civil remedy of damages and/or injunctive relief is pursued. 6°
50. See, e.g., Golden v. Dungan, 20 Cal. App. 3d 295, 302-03, 97 Cal. Rptr. 577, 581-82
(1971); Taylor v. Vallelunga, 171 Cal. App. 2d 107, 109, 339 P.2d 910, 911 (1959).
51. See text accompanying notes 19-29 supra.
52. See text accompanying notes 30-50 supra.
53. D. DOBBS. HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 532 (1973) [hereinafter cited as D.
DOBBS].
54. Bloustein, supra note 7, at 1002-03.
55. Id. at 1003.
56. Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 88, 291 P.2d 194,
198 (1955).
57. Sedler, supra note 2, at 168.
58. See text accompanying notes 96-97 infra.
59. See text accompanying notes 61-97 infra.
60. See text accompanying notes 98-105 infra.
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1. Inadequacy of Injunctions
The long history of equitable self-limitation has too frequently resulted in
judicial reluctance to fashion specific relief; therefore, injunctions are not
readily granted.61 Although injunctive relief was formerly granted only for
property rights and would not lie for a purely personal right such as privacy,
this limitation is now nearly obsolete. 62 Even so, other problems remain in
the granting of equitable relief from dignitary harms.
Equitable relief will be denied if the legal remedy is adequate, or if it has
not been proven that the legal remedy is inadequate. 63 The plaintiff cannot
merely allege that no other adequate remedy is available; the plaintiff must
plead and prove that actual or threatened irreparable injury will result unless
an injunction is issued.64 For example, in Chappell v. Stewart,65 the court
refused to enjoin the defendant from causing private detectives to follow
plaintiff, in part because plaintiff failed to prove that damages were inade-
quate to prevent further harm. 66 Even if money damages were determined to
be adequate compensation for the inconvenience, annoyance, and interfer-
ence caused in the plaintiff's social and business life, the "shadowing" in
the Chappell case was a continuous course of conduct. Thus, a better
argument for an injunction could have been made based on an expected
multiplicity of suits.
67
Another problem in the granting of injunctive relief from dignitary harms
is the difficulty of describing with sufficient certainty and exactitude the
conduct from which the defendant is to be restrained. Each and every
injunction against harassing conduct must be able to pass the same scrutiny
that a proposed criminal statute against harassment would have to under-
go. 68 If the injunction is too broad or vague, it will be unenforceable.
69
Instead of asking trial court judges to fashion equitable relief in each case, it
would appear to be more efficient, economical, and equitable to enact a
criminal statute that proscribes any conduct constituting harassment within
narrowly defined boundaries.
70
61. D. DOBBS, supra note 53, at 534.
62. See Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc., 30 Cal. 2d 110, 117, 180 P.2d 321, 325
(1947).
63. D. DOBBS, supra note 53, at 534.
64. Renzel Co. v. Warehousemen's Union, 16 Cal. 2d 369, 373, 106 P.2d 1, 3 (1940).
65. 82 Md. 323, 33 A. 542 (1896).
66. Id. at 325, 33 A. at 543.
67. See Harlow v. Feder, 89 Cal. App. 435, 439-40, 264 P. 782, 783 (1928).
68. A party "cannot be held guilty of contempt for violating ani injunction that is uncertain
or ambiguous . . . just as he may not be held guilty of violating a criminal statute that fails to
give him adequate notice of the prohibited acts." Brunton v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 2d 202,
205, 124 P.2d 831, 833-34 (1942).
69. Id.
70. Applying a single standard established by a criminal statute would be a superior
solution for harassment cases. "By laying down standards and criteria in advance, repeated
applications of the law, within loosely controlled ranges, are possible, while at the same time
members of the community are forewarned as to punishable criminal behavior." W. CLARK &
W. MARSHALL, CRIMES 4 (7th ed. 1967).
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Even- if -it is phrased with adequate specificity, an injunction will not be
issued where enforcement of it cannot be practically carried out.71 If an
injunction is obtained in a harassment action, enforcement may be difficult
and impractical. The police are unable to be with the plaintiff continually to
enforce the defendant's compliance with the injunction, so the injunction
can only be enforced by contempt proceedings. If the defendant is charged
with criminal contempt, the proceedings must adhere to the rigorous protec-
tions of criminal procedure. 72 This may make a district attorney reluctant to
initiate the contempt proceedings, especially if the injunction is somewhat
vague73 or overbroad74 so that its constitutionality may be readily attacked.
In a harassment case, it may be difficult to obtain an injunction that will
be effective, yet not be too broad so as to infringe upon the perpetrator's
right to pursue legitimate conduct. In Galella v. Onassis, the court found
that injunctive relief was appropriate to protect Jackie Kennedy Onassis and
her children from further harassment by "paparazzo" 76 Ronald Galella, a
free-lance photographer. The court of appeals found, however, that the
injunction granted by the district court was broader than required, and
therefore proceeded to decrease the protection originally granted.
77
In using his "paparazzo" technique to report on Mrs. Onassis, Galella
had been making himself as obnoxious to her and as visible to the public as
possible in order to publicize his work. To protect Mrs. Onassis from this
harassing conduct, the district court had enjoined Galella from: (1) keeping
Mrs. Onassis and her children under surveillance or following any of them;
(2) approaching within 100 yards of their home or the children's schools, or
within 75 yards of either child or 50 yards of Mrs. Onassis; (3) using the
name, portrait, or picture of Mrs. Onassis or her children for advertising; or
(4) attempting to communicate with Mrs. Onassis or her children except
through her attorney.78
The court of appeals noted that the relief must be tailored to Galella's
"paparazzo" attacks, which distinguish his behavior from that of other
photographers, and that the injunction should not unnecessarily infringe
upon Galella's reasonable efforts to report on and photograph Mrs. Onas-
sis. 79 The court, therefore, modified the district court's injunction to pro-
hibit only: (1) any approach within 25 feet of Mrs. Onassis, or any touching
71. D. DOBBS, supra note 53, at 534.
72. People v. Saffell, 74 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 967, 982, 168 P.2d 497, 506 (1946).
73. An injunction, like a criminal statute, cannot be so vague that persons of ordinary
intelligence would not know when they are committing a violation. See text accompanying
notes 228-29 infra.
74. Overbreadth must be eliminated so that there will be no "chilling" effect upon first
amendment freedoms. See text accompanying note 232 infra.
75. 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973).
76. Literally, "paparazzo" is a kind of annoying insect, similar to the English "gadfly."
Id. at 991-92.
77. Id. at 998.
78. Id. at 993.
79. Id. at 998.
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of her person; (2) any blocking of her movement in public places and thor-
oughfares; (3) any act foreseeably or reasonably calculated to place the life
and safety of Mrs. Onassis in danger; and (4) any conduct that would
reasonably be foreseen to harass, alarm, or frighten her. s0 The court of
appeals felt this modified relief would be adequate to protect Mrs. Onassis
and still allow Galella the opportunity to photograph and report on the
public activities of Mrs. Onassis.
81
In a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Circuit
Judge Timbers expressed his belief that the modifications to the injunction
were unwarranted and unworkable 82 Judge Timbers pointed out that the
modified injunction provides no restrictions whatsoever against Galella's
hovering at the entrance to Mrs. Onassis' home or at the children's school.
8 3
The dissenter protested the majority's abandonment of the findings of the
district court84 in relation to the amount of protection needed, and noted the
unexplained 84 percent reduction in the distance that Galella was required to
keep from Mrs. Onassis, and the 87 percent reduction of the distance he was
required to maintain from her children. 85 Moreover, Judge Timbers feared
that the majority overlooked the fact that Galella had in the past jeopardized
the lives and safety of Mrs. Onassis and her children in spite of previous
restraining orders of the district court then in effect.86 Judge Timbers also
dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc, noting the majority's
inconsistency in condemning Galella's outrageous and dangerous conduct
toward Mrs. Onassis and her children on the one hand, yet effectively
stripping them of the protection of the district court injunction on the
other. 
87
In cases of harassment such as Galella, an injunction prohibiting further
harassment may be effective if an injunction such as that issued by the
district court in Galella is allowed to stand. By narrowing the injunction in
an effort to prevent infringement upon Galella's right to report and photo-
graph a public figure, however, the court of appeals eliminated necessary
protections from the district court's injunction. Galella's harassing conduct
was clearly criminal, and could have been prosecuted under New York's
criminal harassment statute. 88 If a criminal harassment statute were adopted
in California, there would be no need for one.to spend the time and money
seeking an injunction that might ultimately prove ineffective.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 999.
82. Id. at 1001 (Timbers, J., dissenting).
83. Id.
84. The decision of the district court is reported at 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
85. 487 F.2d at 1001 (Timbers, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 1002.
87. Id. at 1006.
88. Id. at 995. New York's criminal harassment statute, N.Y. PENAL LAW §240.25
(McKinney 1967), is discussed in note 146 and accompanying text infra.
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An injunction was also granted in the much earlier case of Hawks v.
Yancey. 89 In this case, plaintiff ended her six-year affair with the defendant
because he would not get a divorce. The defendant continued to try to make
himself a part of plaintiff's life against her will, prevented her from forming
relationships with others, pursued her with letters and telephone calls and
accosted her in public. At a hearing for a temporary injunction, the judge did
not issue the injunction because the defendant had agreed with the judge
that he would no longer harass the plaintiff. 9° On appeal, the injunction was
finally ordered. 9' It is questionable, though, whether an injunction would be
effective. The strong emotions in harassment cases may result in conduct not
controllable through the civil process. In situations such as Hawks, however,
where no criminal statute is available, injunctive relief is the only possible
device92 by which the plaintiff may be protected from the unwanted intru-
sion in his or her life.
93
In another case 94 involving a jilted lover, a temporary restraining order
was granted, but the defendant persistently violated the order and a perma-
nent injunction was not issued until numerous hearings had been held
extending over a period of six years. An injunction is only as effective as its
enforcement capability; because the defendant in this case appeared from
her conduct to be in need of psychiatric help, it was questionable whether an
injunction would be effective. 95 Without a criminal statute allowing the police
to intervene, though, an injunction affords the only possibility of relief.
Even if an injunction is granted, it may be entirely ineffective in a
harassment case. A party intending to engage in harassing conduct would be
no more deterred by the issuance of an injunction than he or she would be by
the threat of an action for damages. 96 Because harassment cases often
involve litigants with strong feelings that the law is unlikely to affect, the
only result of an ineffective injunction is disrespect for the legal process.
97
Although even a criminal statute may not deter a perpetrator of the harass-
ment, at least the victim would have the benefit of immediate police
protection. Without such a statute, the victim is without police protection
and unable to defend against the perpetrator's harassing conduct.
2. Police Protection
If a victim of harassment contacts the police for help or to report the
perpetrator of the harassment, the police will be unable to give any assist-
89. 265 S.W. 233 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
90. rd. at 236.
91. Id. at 239.
92. These traditional limitations on injunctive relief are still present today, notwithstand-
ing the evolution of the tort theories of invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
93. Sedler, supra note 2, at 170.
94. Webber v. Gray, 228 Ark. 289, 307 S.W.2d 80 (1957). The facts of this case are
contained in the text accompanying notes 15-16 supra.
95. Sedler, supra note 2, at 170.
96. Id. at 166.
97. Id.
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ance because the harassing conduct does not fit into any of the existing
criminal statutes.98 California does have criminal statutes proscribing some
offenses that may result from or be related to harassment, such as assault,
99
disturbing the peace,' °° and annoying or anonymous telephone calls.
10'
Unless the harassing conduct includes an act proscribed by one of these
existing criminal statutes, police protection is unavailable. Harassment
alone does not rise to the level of assault since this would require an
attempted battery, 102 nor can harassment be punished under the disturbing
the peace statute because harassment is aimed at an individual rather than
the public. 103 Neither is the phone call statute applicable to harassment since
it requires a specific intent to annoy and the caller must either be anony-
mous, or use obscene or threatening language.
104
In most cases, harassment is a traumatic experience for the victim. Pursuit
of a civil remedy only prolongs this trauma, and may even intensify the
emotional distress because the victim remains accessible and vulnerable to
further harassment throughout the civil proceedings. The public interest in
preserving individual integrity would seem to dictate that this trauma be
terminated at the earliest possible opportunity. If there is a criminal statute
proscribing harassment, the victim may be able to stop the harassment with
only a single telephone call to the police. 105 Not only would the victim have
a resource for help, but society as a whole would have protection against the
harm to societal interests caused by harassing conduct.
PUBLIC INTEREST IN PREVENTING HARASSMENT
When viewed as a tort, harassment can be categorized either as invasion
of privacy106 or intentional infliction of emotional distress. 107 The actual
wrong inflicted, though, is broader than these two categories of tortious
conduct. Harassment is not only an injury to an individual, but is an
infringement upon the societal interest in preserving individual dignity and
98. An example of the inability of the police to render assistance was reported in the story
about the harassment of newscaster Linda Douglass, discussed in note 12 supra. Douglass said
she "felt like a jerk" after calling the police and hearing their argument over what criminal
category in which to put the offense-peeping tom, attempted rape, or burglary. The police
sympathized with and humored her, but were unable to take any action against the perpetrator
of the harassing conduct because the conduct did not fall within any of the existing criminal
statutes. Murphy, One Victim's Story, NEw WEST, February 28, 1977, at 23-24.
99. CAL. PENAL CODE §240.
100. CAL. PENAL CODE §415. (In 1974, the scope of this statute was narrowed and the title
changed from "Disturbing the peace" to "Fighting, noise, offensive words.")
101. CAL. PENAL CODE §653m.
102. A battery is defined as "any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the
person of another." CAL. PENAL CODE §242. An assault is "an unlawful attempt, coupled with a
present ability, to conimit a violent injury on the person of another." CAL. PENAL CODE §240.
103. The disturbing the peace statute punishes one who: (1) ufilawfully fights, or challenges
another to fight, in a public place; or (2) maliciously and willfully disturbs another by loud and
unreasonable noise; or (3) uses offensive words in a public place likely to cause a violent
reaction. CAL. PENAL CODE §415.
104. CAL. PENAL CODE §653m.
105. If harassment is codified as a crime, the police would be authorized to respond as they
do to any other reported crime.
106. See text accompanying notes 19-29 supra.
107. See text accompanying notes 30-50 supra.
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personal autonomy. The strong public interest in providing protection from
the type of harm caused by harassment is indicated by the right to privacy
expressly granted in the California Constitution and implied in the federal
constitution.
A. Assault Upon Dignity
It has been suggested that all assaults upon privacy are really blows to a
person's independence, dignity, and integrity. 10 8 "He who may intrude upon
another at will is the master of the other and, in fact, intrusion is a primary
weapon of the tyrant."' 1 9 An intrusion is demeaning to individuality be-
cause our western culture defines individuality as including the right to be
free from certain types of intrusions. 110 The intrusion is an affront to personal
dignity, and even the resulting mental trauma or distress flows from the
indignity perpetrated upon the individual."'1 The right to privacy preserves
an individual's essential human dignity."12 This interest in securing personal
autonomy is an interest that society shares. 13 A society cannot function
effectively unless it preserves to its members the right of privacy because
this right is so essential to individual existence.1
14
The right to be let alone has been regarded as the right most valued by
civilized persons." 5 Surely, then, it is well within the public interest to
preserve this right. The imposition of criminal penalties for harassment is
justified because criminal statutes are intended to prevent undesirable con-
duct and thus protect societal interests. 116 Whereas the function of tort law is
to compensate one for the harm suffered, the aim of the criminal law is to
protect the public against such harm by punishing harmful results of con-
duct, or at least conduct likely to result in harm, thereby deterring such
conduct." 7 Criminal law defines socially intolerable conduct;118 if harass-
ment is a blow to human dignity, then such conduct is outside the limits of
reasonably acceptable behavior in society. Harassment seems to be criminal
conduct; but unless this type of conduct is specifically prohibited by the
108. Bloustein, supra note 7, at 971.
109. Id. at 974 (footnote omitted).
110. Id. at 973.
111. Id.
112. S. HUFSTEDLER, THE DIRECTIONS AND MISDIRECTIONS OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF
PRIVACY 15 (1971) (text of 28th Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture delivered by The
Honorable Shirley M. Hufstedler before The Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
May H1, 1971).
113. Id.
114. In autocratic societies, this right is ordinarily reserved principally for the ruling
class; but even among the general populace, particularly after the regime has con-
solidated power, privacy cannot be eliminated totally. A democratic regime appears
to be altogether impossible without substantial deference to personal privacy. A.
WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 23-51 (1st ed. 1967).
Id.
115. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
116. W. LAFAVE & A. SCoTr, CRIMINAL LAW 21 (1972).
117. Id. at 11.
118. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 4 (2d ed. 1969).
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Penal Code, the perpetrator of the harassment cannot be prosecuted. n 9 The
wrong in the harassment cases is a violation of the public interest, and
should be subject to prosecution in the interest of the people of the state.
This same value of individual dignity is also enforced in numerous
statutes making various other intrusions on privacy a crime. 120 For example,
"peeping tom" statutes make it a crime to spy upon another through open
windows. 121 More recently, statutes have been enacted to prohibit electronic
eavesdropping and surveillance. 122 Another group of statutes intended to
preserve individual integrity prohibits disclosure of certain confidential infor-
mation. 1 3 The common thread running through all these statutes, as well as
the privacy tort cases, is the social value of preserving the individual's
independence and freedom from unwarranted intrusions.124 A criminal stat-
ute proscribing harassment appears to be a logical addition to this type of
protection. The magnitude of society's interest in the right to privacy is
indicated by the express and implied protections of that right in the state and
federal constitutions.
B. Constitutional Guaranties to Privacy
1. United States Constitution
The societal interest in human dignity also underlies the right to privacy
implied in the federal constitution.125 Although the Constitution does not
expressly mention any right of privacy, the United States Supreme Court has
recognized the existence of a constitutional guaranty of privacy in certain
areas. 126
One of the protected areas of privacy is the right of association contained
in the first amendment.'2 7 The right of privacy in criminal prosecutions
arises from the protections of the fourth and fifth amendments precluding
illegal search and seizure and self-incrimination.12 Support has also been
found in the ninth amendment for unenumerated fundamental rights such as
119. No act is criminal or punishable unless proscribed or authorized by the Penal Code.
CAL. PENAL CODE §6.
120. Bloustein, supra note 7, at 995-97.
121. California's "peeping tom" statute is part of the disorderly conduct statute. CAL.
PENAL CODE §647(h).
122. California has enacted comprehensive legislation dealing with this type of intrusion.
CAL. PENAL CODE §§630-637.2.
123. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §618 (opening or publishing sealed letters addressed to
another); CAL. PENAL CODE §641 (bribery of telegraph or telephone agent to disclose message).
124. Bloustein, supra note 7, at 994.
125. Id. at 974.
126. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (contraceptives).
127. 381 U.S. at 484. Cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (pornography in home);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S., 449 (1958) (political association protected from governmental
intrusions).
128. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 8-9 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967), Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,656
(1961); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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privacy, 29 and privacy has also been found within the concept of liberty
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. 1
30
The core of the constitutional protection of privacy is found in the fourth
amendment's protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. 131 The
Supreme Court has indicated that the purpose of the fourth amendment
protection is the preservation of individual liberty. 132 The social interest
underlying protection against harassment is also liberty of the person, the
same interest protected by the fourth amendment. 133 Because privacy is a
right so fundamental that its roots can be traced to several provisions in the
Bill of Rights, 34 the violation of an individual's privacy by harassing
conduct is an affront to society as well as a wrong to the victim.
2. California Constitution
Further support for the concept of privacy as a public interest can be
found in the 1974 amendment to the California Constitution. By a voter
initiative ballot measure, "privacy" was added to the inalienable rights
guaranteed by Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution. 135 The
amendment was proposed and passed in response to, but not limited to, the
threat of uncontrolled governmental surveillance and data collection activi-
ty. 36 Subsequent case law has begun to expand the boundaries of this new
129. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
130. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973), (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923)).
131. See Clark, Constitutional Sources of the Penumbral Right to Privacy, 19 VILL. L. Ruv.
833, 856 (1974).
132. See Bloustein, supra note 7, at 974.
133. Id. at 977.
134. See notes 127-130 and accompanying text supra.
135. CAL. CONST. art. 1, §1 now reads: "All people are by nature free and independent and
have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring,
possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and priva-
cy." (Emphasis added).
136. A statement drafted by the proponents of the amendment and included in the state's
election brochure is as follows:
The proliferation of government snooping and data collecting is threatening to
destroy our traditional freedoms. Government agencies seem to be competing to
compile the most extensive sets of dossiers of American citizens. Computerization of
records makes it possible to create "cradle-to-grave" profiles on every American.
At present there are no effective restraints on the information activities of govern-
ment and business. This amendment creates a legal and enforceable right ofprivacy
for every Californian.
The right of privacy is the right to be left alone. It is a fundamental and compelling
interest. It protects our homes, our families, our thoughts, our emotions, our expres-
sions, our personalities, our freedom to communion, and our freedom to associate
with the people we choose. It prevents government and business interests from
collecting and stockpiling unnecessary information about us and from misusing
information gathered for one purpose in order to serve other purposes or to embar-
rass us.
Fundamental to our privacy is the ability to control circulation of personal informa-
tion. This is essential to social relationships and personal freedom. The proliferation
oTrgovernment and business records over which we have no control limits our ability
to control our personal lives. Often we do not know that these records even exist and
we are certainly unable to determine who has access to them.
Even more dangerous is the loss of control over the accuracy of government and
business records on individuals. Obviously, if the person is unaware of the record, he
or she cannot review the file and correct inevitable mistakes. Even if the existence of
this information is known, few government agencies or private businesses permit
individuals to review their files and correct errors.
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constitutional right beyond purely governmental intrusion about which the
proponents of the amendment were concerned.
In Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court,137 the California Supreme
Court extended the constitutional right of privacy to include financial infor-
mation a depositor discloses to a bank. 138 The court noted that the 1974
constitutional amendment "elevated the right of privacy to an 'inalienable
right' expressly protected by force of constitutional mandate." 139 In Porten
v. University of San Francisco, 14 an invasion of privacy action was allowed
to be brought against a private university based on the new constitutional
guaranty to privacy. 141 In Porten, the court stated that privacy is not only
protected against state action, but is an inalienable right that no one may
violate. 142 This decision also noted that the elevation of the right to be free
from invasions of privacy to constitutional status was apparently intended as
an extension of the privacy right. 143
In light of the importance placed on the right to privacy in both the state
and federal constitutions, society should be protected from invasions of this
right by harassing conduct. Criminal sanctions against harassment would be
an appropriate means of accomplishing this protection.
HARASSMENT AS A CRIME
Seven states have enacted statutes making harassment a crime. 144 These
statutes are patterned after a code section formulated by the American Law
Institute for the Model Penal Code. The relevant portion of this section
provides that "[a] person commits a petty misdemeanor if, with purpose to
The average citizen also does not have control over what information is collected
about him. Much is secretly collected. We are required to report some information,
regardless of our wishes for privacy or our belief that there is no public need for the
information. Each time we apply for a credit card or a life insurance policy file a tax
return, interview for a Job, or get a drivers' license, a dossier is oeneada
informational profile is sketched. Modem technology is capable of monitoring,
centralizing and computerizing this information which eliminates any possibility of
individual privacy.
The right of privacy is an important American heritage and essential to the funda-
mental rights guaranteed by the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments to
the U.S. Constitution. This right should be abridged only when there is compelling
public need. Some information may remain as designated public records but only
when the availability of such information is clearly in the public interest.
CAL. SEC. OF STATE, 1972 CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION BROCHURE 26-27 (emphasis in
original) (argument in favor of Proposition 11, a legislative constitutional amendment adding
right of privacy to inalienable rights of people).
137. 15 Cal. 3d 652, 542 P.2d 977, 125 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1975).
138. Id. at 656, 542 P.2d at 979, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
139. Id.
140. 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1976).
141. Id. at 832, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
142. Id. at 829, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
143. Id.
144. ARK. STAT. ANN. §41-2909 (1975); COLO. REV. STAT. §18-9-111 (1973); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. §525.070 (Baldwin 1975); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, §506-A (1976); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§240.25 (McKinney 1967); OR. REV. STAT. §166.065 (1975); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §2709
(Purdon 1973).
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harass another, he: . . . (5) engages in any other course of alarming
conduct serving no legitimate purpose of the actor." 
145
New York was the first state to enact a criminal harassment statute based
on the Model Penal Code section. New York's statute amplified the lan-
guage of that section to provide:
A person is guilty of harassment when, with intent to harass,
annoy or alarm another person:. . .5. He engages in a course of
conduct or repeatedly commits acts which alarm or seriously
annoy such other person and which serve no legitimate purpose. 146
This statute was adopted by the New York Legislature in 1965, and became
effective on September 1, 1967. Since then, six other states have enacted
criminal harassment statutes containing language similar to the New York
provision. 147 These statutes were enacted to reach disorderly conduct creat-
145. MODEL PENAL CODE §250.4 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). The other subsections of
this section are:
(1) makes a telephone call without purpose of legitimate communication; or
(2) insults, taunts or challenges another in a manner likely to provoke violent or
disorderly response; or
(3) makes repeated communications anonymously or at extremely inconvenient
hours, or in offensively coarse language; or
(4) subjects another to an offensive touching ....
Id. Subsection (5) is that which .should be looked to for a prohibition against harassment,
because the other subsections are already covered under other sections of the California Penal
Code or may be unconstitutionally overbroad and thus invalid. Subsection (1) is covered by
CAL. PENAL CODE §653m, and most other states have similar provisions, see Note, Unwanted
Telephone Calls-A Legal Remedy?, 1967 UTAH L. REV. 379 (1967). Subsection (2) proscribes
"fighting words" (see note 194 infra) and is covered by CAL. PENAL CODE §415 (3). Subsection
(3) would most likely be found unconstitutional due to overbreadth because it attempts to
prohibit "offensively coarse" language. In Bolles v. People, 541 P.2d 80 (Colo. 1975), a
similar statute subsection was held to be facially overbroad because it potentially included
constitutionally protected speech within its proscriptions. Subsection (4) is related to assault.
CAL. PENAL CODE §240.
This section (MODEL PENAL CODE §250.4) was needed to fill what would otherwise be a gap in
the Model Penal Code. One of its purposes is to extend the penal law to new areas of
misbehavior involving aggravated assault on the feelings of individuals. MODEL PENAL CODE
art. 250, comment at 4, and §250.9, comment at 52 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961).
146. N.Y. PENAL LAW §240.25 (McKinney 1967), enacted by New York Legislature in
1965, effective September 1, 1967. This statute was intended to proscribe conduct that would
constitute disorderly conduct if public alarm or disorder were intended or created, but does not
amount to such because the conduct alarms or harasses an individual rather than the public. Id.,
Practice Commentary at 159.
147. ARK. STAT. ANN. §41-2909(i)(e)(1975), effective January 1, 1976: "A person commits
the offense of harassment if, with purpose to harass, annoy, or alarm another person, he: . ..
(e) engages in conduct or repeatedly commits acts that alarm or seriously annoy another person
and that serve no legitimate purpose."
COLO. REV. STAT. §18-9-I1 l(I)(d)(1973), effective July 1, 1972: "A person commits harass-
ment if, with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person, he:. . .(d) Engages in conduct
or repeatedly commits acts that alarm or seriously annoy another person and that serve no
legitimate purpose ... "
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §525.070(l)(d)(Badwin 1975), effective January 1, 1975: "A person is
guilty of harassment when with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person he: . . .(d)
Engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts which alarm or seriously annoy such
other person and which serve no legitimate purpose."
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, §506-A (1976), effective May 1, 1976: "A person is guilty of
harassment if, without reasonable cause, he engages in any course of conduct with the intent to
to harass, torment or threaten another person, after having been forbidden to do so by any
sheriff, deputy sheriff, constable, police officer or justice of the peace."
OR. REV. STAT. §166.065(l)(d)(1975), effective Januaryl, 1972: "A person commits the crime
of harrassment [sic] if, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person, he: .. . (d)
Engages in a course of conduct that alarms or seriously annoys another person and which
serves no legitimate purpose."
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ing alarm or annoyance to an individual rather than the general public, 148
and to prevent repeated assaults on individual privacy interests. 
149
An analysis of the existing criminal harassment statites is helpful to the
formulation of a similar statute for California. Such an analysis is aided by a
discussion of the type of intent required, the meaning of "course of con-
duct," the constitutional problems of overbreadth and vagueness, and the
penalties imposed for violation of the harassment statutes.
A. Intent
1. Specific Intent
Of the seven existing criminal harassment statutes, all include the require-
ment of a specific intent to harass, annoy or alarm. 150 If a harassment statute
includes such a specific intent requirement, then proof of an intent to harass,
annoy, or alarm is required to establish a violation of the statute. 151 Specific
intent must be established by proof and cannot be presumed from the act and
its probable consequences. 152 When specific intent is an element of the
offense, it is a question of fact which must be proved like any other fact in
the case,153 and no presumption154 may ever arise that a person intended the
natural consequences of his or her acts. 155 Thus, if specific intent to harass is
an element of a criminal harassment statute, it cannot be presumed that the
perpetrator intended to cause the resulting emotional distress just because
this would be the natural result of the defendant's conduct.
156
Where specific intent is an element of the offense, the defendant must be
allowed to prove any fact tending to show that no such specific intent
existed, 157 and must be allowed to testify regarding his or her intent, state of
mind, or belief.158 A person charged with harassment could argue that his or
her intent was not to harass, but rather to renew an old love affair, or win the
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §2709(3)(Purdon 1973), effective June 6, 1973: "A person commits
a summary offense when, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person:. . . (3) he
engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts which alarm or seriously annoy such
other person and which serve no legitimate purpose."
148. N.Y. PENAL LAW §240.25, Practice Commentary at 159 (McKinney 1967); OR. REV.
STAT. §166.065, Criminal Law Revision Commentary, Proposed Criminal Code, at 218 (1975).
149. Commonwealth v. Duncan, 239 Pa. Super. Ct. 539, 547, 363 A.2d 803, 807 (1976).
150. Although the Model Penal Code section and the Arkansas statute use the word
"purpose" rather than "intent," these words express the same thought and idea. People v.
Armentrout, 118 Cal. App. Supp. 761, 773, 1 P.2d 556, 562 (1931); Estate of Olmstead, 122 Cal.
224, 232-33, 54 P. 745, 747 (1898).
151. E.g., People v. Moyer, 27 N.Y.2d 252, 253,265 N.E.2d 535, 536, 317 N.Y.S.2d 9, 10
(1970); Di Donna v. Di Donna, 72 Misc. 2d 231, 339 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1972).
152. People v. Snyder, 15 Cal. 2d 706,708, 104 P.2d 639,640 (1940); People v. Mize, 80 Cal.
41, 45, 22 P. 80, 81 (1889).
153. People v. Maciel, 71 Cal. App. 213, 218, 234 P. 877, 880 (1925).
154. A presumption is an assumption of fact that the law requires to be made from other
facts established in the action. CAL. EVID. CODE §600(a). A presumption is to be distinguished
from an inference, which is a deduction of fact that may logically and reasonably be drawn
from other facts established in the action. CAL. EvID. CODE §600(b).
155. People v. Maciel, 71 Cal. App. 213, 218, 234 P. 877, 880 (1925).
156. The presumption that a person intended the ordinary consequences of his or her
voluntary act is inapplicable in a criminal action to establish the specific intent of the defendant
where specific intent is an element of the crime charged. CAL. EVID. CODE §665.
157. People v. Martel, 21 Cal. App. 573, 576, 132 P. 600, 601 (1913).
158. People v. Sheasby, 82 Cal. App. 459, 464, 255 P. 836, 838 (1927).
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victim's affections, or save the victim's soul, or some other "non-evil"
motive. The requirement of specific intent, however, cannot be overcome
by proof of a "good" motive.159 Such proof is permissible and sometimes
valuable, but it is never essential and is merely a circumstance to be
considered by the jury. t"' It is the intent to cause the ultimate emotional
distress, regardless of motive, that establishes the requisite element of
specific intent to harass. If the defendant did not have the specific intent to
cause the ultimate act, a conviction for a specific intent crime cannot
stand. 161 Thus, to establish specific intent in a harassment case under these
statutes, it must be proven that the defendant intended that his or her conduct
would have the ultimate effect of harassing the victim.
2. General Criminal Intent
There is no requirement that specific intent be an element of every crime.
If no specific intent or state of mind is required by definition, the law
requires only that there be a unity of act and intent, 162 that is, a general
criminal intent. To find a general criminal intent, it is never necessary to
prove that the defendant intended to violate the law or cause the ultimate
harm; it is sufficient that he or she intentionally committed the forbidden
act. 163 General criminal intent, then, is the intention to do an act that
violates the law, and does not necessarily involve an intent to violate the
law; hence, ignorance of the illegal nature of an act is not a bar to
conviction. 
1 64
In regard to general criminal intent, one is presumed to have intended all
the natural, probable, and usual consequences of an unlawful act done
voluntarily, and the intent to cause the ultimate harm need not be alleged or
proved. 65 Thus, if harassment is made a general intent crime, it need not be
proven that the defendant intended to cause the victim to suffer harassment,
but only that harassment would be a natural, probable or usual consequence
of the perpetrator's conduct.
The elements of the crime of harassment can be further delineated by
requiring that the perpetrator's conduct be carried out in a knowing and
willful manner. This would resolve any claim that the statute is too vague
166
without a specific intent requirement. "Knowingly" means that the defend-
159. People v. Durrant, 116 Cal. 179, 208, 48 P. 75, 82 (1897).
160. Id.
161. People v. Armentrout, 118 Cal. App. Supp. 761, 774, 1 P.2d 556, 562 (1931).
162. CAL. PENAl, CODE §20.
163. People v. Bateman, 175 Cal. App. 2d 69, 74, 345 P.2d 334, 337 (1959). "An unlawful
intent is presumed from the doing of an unlawful act. This presumption is inapplicable in a
criminal action to establish the specific intent of the defendant where specific intent is an
element of the crime charged." See CAL. EvID. CODE §668.
164. People v. Kuykendall, 134 Cal. App. 2d 642, 645-46, 285 P.2d 996, 999 (1955).
165. People v. Wade, 71 Cal. App. 2d 646, 652, 163 P.2d 59, 63 (1945); CAL. EVID. CODE
§665 (see note 156 supra).
166. A criminal statute cannot be so vague that persons of ordinary intelligence would not
know when they are committing a crime. See notes 228-29 and accompanying text infra.
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ant knew what he or she was doing.167 "Willfully" implies a purpose or
willingness to commit the act.168 Therefore, in order to find the requisite
general criminal intent for harassment, it would have to be proven that the
perpetrator of the harassment acted consciously and purposely in carrying
out the course of conduct that ultimately results in harassment.
A requirement that the defendant's conduct be carried out "knowingly
and willfully" would act as a safeguard against abuse where specific intent
to harass is not required. 169 A person could not be found guilty of harass-
ment unless he or she was conscious of the conduct engaged in, and was
aware that this conduct would harass the victim and/or a reasonable person,
even though there may be no intent to harass. Moreover, if punishment is
imposed only for conduct that is knowingly and willfully done, the statute
cannot be held unconstitutionally vague for punishing without warning.
70
To comply further with the due process requirement of not punishing
without warning, a criminal harassment statute should define the type of
conduct constituting the crime of harassment.
B. Course of Conduct
The deletion of the specific intent requirement would necessitate an
expansion of the statutory description of the type of conduct constituting the
crime of harassment. 171 In order to proscribe a certain type of behavior, a
statute must define the proscribed conduct with enough specificity so that
persons of ordinary intelligence will know when they are committing a
crime. 172 The statute must provide a standard by which a reasonable person
can determine if he or she is carrying out a course of conduct that will result
in harassment. Case law in those states having harassment statutes provides
some guidelines for defining the type of conduct that harasses, alarms, or
seriously annoys another person.
167. CAL. PENAL CODE §7(5).
The word "knowingly" imports only a knowledge that the facts exist which bring
the act or omission within the provisions of this code. It does not require any
knowledge of the unlawfulness of such act or omission.
Id.
168. CAL. PENAL CODE §7(l).
The word "willfully," when applied to the intent with which an act is done or
omitted, implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act, or make the
omission referred to. It does not require any intent to violate law, or to injure
another, or to acquire any advantage.
Id.
169. For example, the "knowingly and willfully" requirement would prevent a criminal
harassment statute from being used to impose criminal penalties upon a mentally ill person for
exhibition of bizarre behavior.
170. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101-02 (1945).
171. In the cases that have upheld harassment statutes, specific intent to harass was an
essential element of the crime and thus "course of conduct" was not unconstitutionally vague.
This is illustrated in Commonwealth v. Duncan, 239 Pa. Super. Ct. 539, 549, 363 A.2d 803. 808
(1976).
172. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 220 (1875).
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In People v. Hotchkiss,'173 a New York court said that a course of conduct
is more than an isolated verbal or physical act. 174 In this case, the defendant
had been arrested during a racetrack disturbance and then said to a deputy
sheriff, "If I could have drawn my gun fast enough, I would have shot
you."1 75 The appellate court reversed the lower court's harassment convic-
tion, determining that this one statement did not constitute a course of
conduct. 176 According to this court, a course of conduct for purposes of the
crime of harassment is "a pattern of conduct composed of same or similar
acts repeated over a period of time, however short, which establishes a
continuity of purpose in the mind of the actor." 1 77
The New York courts seem, however, to be unsettled as to whether more
than one act is required to constitute harassment. The court in Hotchkiss
decided that more than an isolated act was required to constitute a course of
conduct. Later, in People v. Caine ,178 a different New York court inter-
preted the statute as requiring both a "course of conduct" and "repeatedly
committed acts," and thus one act could not constitute a course of con-
duct. 179 Four years later in People v. Tralli, 80 another New York court
reverted to a literal reading of the statute ("course of conduct or repeatedly
committed acts") so that one act could constitute a course of conduct for
purposes of the statute. 181
These seemingly inconsistent results may be reconciled by noting that the
one act in Tralli was planned and deliberate,'18 2 whereas Caine and Hotch-
kiss involved spontaneous, emotional, verbal outbursts. 8 3 It would seem
then that if the act is planned and deliberate, a specific intent to harass is
inherent in the perpetrator's conduct. Perhaps the distinction lies in the
court's ability to perceive the presence or absence of specific intent, rather
than one or more acts. If the conduct consists of only one act, but that act is
done with the specific intent to harass the victim, this would constitute a
course of conduct within the meaning of the New York statute.
In formulating a harassment statute for California, it would be impractic-
able to list every conceivable act resulting in harassment. But if only a
general criminal intent is required, 184 then the conduct to be prohibited must
173. 59 Misc. 2d 823, 300 N.Y.S.2d 405 (1969).
174. Id. at 824, 300 N.Y.S.2d at 407.
175. Id. at 824, 300 N.Y.S.2d at 406.
176. Id. at 824, 300 N.Y.S.2d at 407.
177. Id.
178. 70 Misc. 2d 178, 333 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1972).
179. Id. at 179, 333 N.Y.S.2d at 210.
180. 88 Misc. 2d 117, 387 N.Y.S.2d 37 (1976).
181. Id. at 118, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 38.
182. The defendant had manuevered the victim into a position whereby she would readily
observe his exposed genitals. Id. at 117, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 37.
183. In Caine, the defendant had addressed obscene language toward a police office who
had stopped him for a traffic violation. 70 Misc. 2d at 179, 333 N.Y.S.2d at 209. In Hotchkiss,
the defendant had said to a deputy sheriff after his arrest: "If I could have drawn my gun fast
enough, I would have shot you." 59 Misc. 2d at 824, 300 N.Y.S.2d at 406.
184. See text accompanying notes 171-72 supra.
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be described in more detail than merely "course of conduct which alarms or
annoys another." 185 The California statute can define course of conduct as a
pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time,
however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose. This definition, similar
to that set forth in Hotchkiss,186 would be sufficient to demonstrate that the
conduct proscribed is that which results in harassment. The "continuity of
purpose" need not be an intent to harass; it need only be conduct which
results in harassment.
1. Substantial Emotional Distress
The type of conduct to be proscribed can be further defined to avoid
unconstitutional vagueness by relating the conduct to the harm caused the
victim. 87 A two-pronged standard by which to measure the harm should be
included so that only conduct which would cause a reasonable person to
suffer substantial emotional distress, and actually does cause this victim to
suffer such distress, would be unlawful.
The proscribed conduct can be described in terms of the harm caused the
victim. Rather than relying on definitions of "annoy," "alarm," or
"harass" to determine if the defendant has harassed the victim, a statute
could provide that harassment has been committed if the victim has been
annoyed, alarmed, or harassed by the defendant to the point where the victim
suffers substantial emotional distress.1 88 The requirement of "substantial"
emotional distress would eliminate prosecutions for petty annoyances or
neighborhood squabbles. For example, a Pennsylvania court reversed a
conviction for harassment where the defendant's only act was severing a
plastic hose which supplied water to his tenant's cottage. 89 In agreeing with
Hotchkiss that this behavior did not constitute a course of conduct within the
meaning of the statute because this was only one isolated act, the court also
noted that the legislature did not intend this type of minor disagreement to
entail criminal sanctions.
190
In addition to a subjective standard requiring actual harm, the inclusion of
an objective "reasonable person" standard 191 in a harassment statute would
further narrow its scope and prevent false or exaggerated charges. Before a
185. See language in the harassment statutes quoted in text accompanying note 146 supra
and in note 147 supra.
186. See text accompanying note 177 supra.
187. Other criminal statutes relate the proscribed conduct to the harm caused the victim,
e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §245 (assault with a deadly weapon or force likely to produce great
bodily injury); CAL. PENAL CODE §273d (infliction of corporeal injury upon wife or child
resulting in a traumatic condition).
188. In People v. Di Feo 69 Misc. 2d 1036, 331 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1972), the court interpreted
New York's harassment statute to require that the victim must actually have been annoyed or
harassed by the defendant. Id. at 1038, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 556.
189.- Commonwealth v. Schnabel, 236 Pa. Super. Ct. 280, 344 A.2d 896 (1975).
190. Id. at 284, 344 A.2d at 898.
191. This objective standard is used to determine whether the victim reacted as would a
reasonable person.
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defendant may be guilty of harassment, proof should be required that not
only did the defendant's conduct cause the victim to suffer emotional
distress, but that the conduct was such as would cause a reasonable person
to suffer substantial emotional distress. 9 2 This requirement would ensure
that a defendant is not convicted for unknowingly causing a hypersensitive
person to become seriously annoyed or alarmed. If the perpetrator of the
harassment is aware of a victim's particular weakness and exploits it,
however, the perpetrator is not absolved of guilt simply because the victim
did not react as a "reasonable person." In such cases, a "reasonable
person" is interpreted as meahing a reasonable person in the position of that
particular victim. 193
2. Constitutionally Protected Speech and Other Legitimate Purposes
There are some types of conduct that may constitute harassment but
should not be criminalized because they consist of constitutionally protected
speech19 4 or other legitimate purposes. A valid harassment statute cannot be
susceptible of application to speech protected by the first amendment. The
New York case of People v. Carvelas'95 involved a labor dispute in which
the defendant had threatened to "get" the complainant. Defendant was
convicted of harassment on the grounds that this threat was abusive lan-
guage,1 96 or that it was a course of conduct that alarmed or seriously
annoyed the complainant.197 Defendant appealed the conviction, alleging
that the statute was unconstitutional because it proscribed constitutionally
protected speech. The statute was upheld, however, because judicial con-
struction had limited the application of the statute to words and/or gestures
which substantially annoy a person so that he or she would be likely to react
by an act of violence or a breach of the public peace. 198 This construction of,
192. In People v. Benders, 63 Misc. 2d 572, 312 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1970), the court suggested
that due regard should be given to the type or class of victim involved. Id. at 576, 312 N.Y.S.2d
at 609.
193. See People v. Benders, 63 Misc. 2d 572, 574-76, 312 N.Y.S.2d 603, 607-09 (1970). See
text accompanying notes 209-1 infra.
194. The type of speech protected by the Constitution was discussed in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942):
mhe right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention
and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional prob-
lem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting
or "fighting" wrds-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace.
Id. at 571-72 (footnotes omitted).
195. 75 Misc. 2d 616, 348 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1973), rev'd on other grounds, 35 N.Y.2d 803, 321
N.E.2d 550, 362 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1974).
196. Abusive language with the intent to harass is prohibited by N.Y. PENAL LAW
§240.25(2) (McKinney 1967).
197. This alternative basis for the conviction is based on N.Y. PENAI. LAW §240.25(5),
contained in text accompanying note 146 supra.
198. 75 Misc. 2d at 618, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 80. Note, however, that this decision was reversed
because the conduct involved did not come within the scope of the statute as written, nor did
the evidence establish a violation of the statute beyond a reasonable doubt. 35 N.Y.2d 803,
804, 321 N.E.2d 550, 550, 362 N.Y.S.2d 460, 460 (1974).
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the statute is in keeping with Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,199 in which it
was stated that a statute prohibiting offensive words is valid only if the
proscription is limited to the use of words in a public place likely to cause a
breach of the peace. 2' Rather than depending upon a judicial interpretation
to limit the prohibitions on speech, a criminal harassment statute can be
drafted to provide that constitutionally protected speech is excluded from
conduct constituting a "course of conduct."
Conduct serving a legitimate purpose may also be conduct in furtherance
of public policy. The New York case of Di Donna v. Di Donna20' held that
the defendant's conduct did not constitute harassment because he had been
acting in an effort to save his marriage.2 2 The defendant's wife had
petitioned the court for an order of protection to prevent her estranged
husband's "continued and incessant harassment, menacing and reckless
conduct" toward her that had alarmed their daughters. 20 3 The wife alleged
that the husband discussed the breakup of the marriage with the daughters so
often that the children were made to feel guilty and responsible for the
breakup, and that he was trying to use the daughters as a means of bringing
pressure upon their mother to reconcile with him. 20 4 The husband contended
that he had not done anything beyond the scope of his inherent right to raise
his children. The husband further pointed out that his religious conviction
regarded marriage as indissolvable, and that the public policy of New York
had not gone so far as to regard divorce as a desirable social policy. 20 5 The
court found that there could be several legitimate purposes for the husband's
conduct, such as maintenance of normal parent-child relationships, reconcil-
iation with his family, preservation of the marriage, and the insurance of his
own mental and emotional health.
2°6
Just as a criminal harassment statute cannot prohibit contitutionally pro-
tected speech, it should not limit conduct which is not unlawful and is in
furtherance of public policy. This exception for conduct serving a legitimate
purpose would also ensure that licensees such as private investigators and
collection agencies would not be hampered in their activities if their conduct
does not go beyond the scope of their licensed activity.
3. Abuse of Statute
A carelessly worded harassment statute may be susceptible of abuse by
private citizens or by police officers acting in their official capacity. An
199. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
200. 315 U.S. at 573. Chaplinsky refers to this type of speech as "fighting words." Id. See
note 194 supra.
201. 72 Misc. 2d 231, 339 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1972).
202. Id. at 233, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
203. Id. at 231, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 593.
204. Id. at 231-32, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 594.
205. Id. at 232, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 594.
206. Id. at 233, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
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example of the use of a harassment statute for other than its intended
purpose is the case of People v. Smolen.207 The defendant had been arrested
for harassment by a police officer after a sidewalk confrontation during
which the defendant had accused the officer of accepting bribes. The court
acquitted the defendant, noting that a "police officer must make himself
insensitive to the abusive and obscene epithets which this court will take
notice are hurled at him almost routinely. ... 208
In People v. Benders, °9 a police officer arrested a marcher in a student
demonstration who swore and made gestures at the officer. In acquitting the
defendant of the crime of harassment, the court noted that in proving intent,
one must question whether it is reasonable for the addressee, under all the
circumstances, to be actually annoyed.210 The court also pointed out that due
regard must be given to the type or class of addressee involved. 211 Due to the
nature of a police officer's job, it would seem that the harassing conduct
must be prolonged and severe to make it punishable under the statute.
Police officers should not be able to use a criminal harassment statute to
make arrests without probable cause. In People v. Schmidt,212 a police
officer came to the defendant's home in order to take custody of her minor
child. The defendant used her body to bar the officer's entrance through the
doorway, and the officer arrested her for harassment. The defendant was
acquitted on the basis that this one incident did not constitute conduct
proscribed by the statute.
213
A way to avoid this type of misuse of the statute by police officers would
be a requirement that if the "victim" of the harassing conduct is a police
officer, he or she cannot also be the arresting officer. This would eliminate
on-the-spot arrests by an officer who is merely irritated or annoyed by the
other party's conduct.
A criminal harassment statute should not be capable of abuse by an
individual through prosecutions for petty or minor annoyances. In a 1976
case in Pennsylvania, Commonwealth v. Duncan,214 the defendant was
convicted of harassment2 15 based on three or four requests to the prosecutrix
that she engage in an illegal sexual act with him. The prosecutrix was a
college student who had fallen asleep on a dormitory couch and was
awakened at 3:30 a.m. by the defendant who leaned close to her face and
made his requests. The defendant left after the prosecutrix refused his
requests and asked that he leave.
207. 69 Misc. 2d 920, 331 N.Y.S.2d 98 (1972).
208. Id. at 923, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
209. 63 Misc. 2d 572, 312 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1970).
210. Id. at 575, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 607.
211. Id. at 576, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 609.
212. 76 Misc. 2d 976, 352 N.Y.S.2d 399 (1974).
213. Id. at 979, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 403.
214. 239 Pa. Super. Ct. 539, 363 A.2d 803 (1976).
215. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §2709 (Purdon 1973). See note 147 supra.
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Although the majority in Duncan upheld the conviction in a four to three
decision, the dissenters felt that the defendant's conduct did not amount to a
criminal offense,216 and that more than an indecent request was necessary to
support a conviction under the statute.2" 7 In his dissent, Judge Hoffman
noted that this section attempts to proscribe behavior that is frightening or
unpleasant but does not constitute an assault or disorderly conduct.2 18 He
warned that the legislature must avoid criminalizing constitutionally protect-
ed verbal conduct or petty nastiness that does not rise to criminal conduct.
He lists three reasons for this: (1) the state runs the risk of criminalizing
generally accepted behavior without giving the actor reasonable notice that
his conduct is criminal; (2) such incidents are too frequent for a judicial
system to handle them efficiently; and (3) courts cannot be expected to
arbitrate personal disputes through the criminal process. 219 Judge Hoffman
goes on to say that" [c]riminal sanction is too severe, too great a stigma, too
costly to all parties, to allow the law to become a 'Big Brother.'
' 220
The majority decision in Duncan also noted that the intent of the legisla-
ture in enacting this statute was not to proscribe isolated acts which would
be of only minor annoyance to the average person, or acts which are
constitutionally protected. 221 Evidently, the majority decided that this de-
fendant's speech was not of the type protected by the first amendment,222
and that the prosecutrix's replies made it clear, or should have made it clear
to a reasonable person, that continued entreaties would be offensive to
her. 223 Results such as that in Duncan can be eliminated by careful drafting
of a harassment statute to ensure that it is used for its intended purpose and
only punishes conduct which causes substantial emotional distress.
C. Vagueness and Overbreadth
If California is to enact a harassment statute, it can be based on the
language in New York's statute224 and the Model Penal Code, 225 but should
be more specific and precise to avoid any attacks on its constitutionality for
overbreadth or vagueness, particularly if the specific intent requirement is
deleted. 226 An inclusion in the statute of the definition of "course of
216. 239 Pa. Super. Ct. at 553, 363 A.2d at 811 (Price, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 549, 363 A.2d at 810 (Hoffman, J., dissenting); id. at 553, 363 A.2d at 811
(Spaeth, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 550-52, 363 A.2d at 809 (Hoffman, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 551 n.4, 363 A.2d at 809 n.4 (Hoffman, J., dissenting).
220. Id. (Hoffman, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 549, 363 A.2d at 808.
222. Id. at 545, 363 A.2d at 806.
223. Id. at 543, 363 A.2d at 805.
224. See text accompanying note 146 supra.
225. See text accompanying note 145 supra.
226. One other state did have a harassment statute similar to the New York and Model
Penal Code sections, but it has repealed in 1973 because the state legislature felt that it was
overly vague. 1973 Haw. Sess. Laws,.Act 136, §711-1106; HousE STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT
No. 726 (1973). The statute had prohibited conduct in which a person "engages in any other
course of harmful or seriously distressing conduct serving no legitimate purpose of the defend-
ant." HAW. REV. STAT. §711-1106(l)(e)(repealed 1973).
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conduct" would provide such specificity.227
A new penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to give notice to a
reasonable person as to what conduct is prohibited in order to comply with
due process requirements. 228 If a statute is intended to proscribe a certain
type of behavior, that conduct must be defined with enough specificity so
that any person can know with certainty when he or she is committing a
crime. 229 In order to determine the amount of specificity that must be
contained in a proposed new harassment statute so that it will not be vague
or overbroad, it is helpful to analyze the validity of existing harassment
statutes as reported in cases in those states with harassment statutes already
in effect.
In People v. Carvelas, 230 the constitutionality of New York's harassment
statute was upheld. The statute had been attacked as being overbroad and
thus chilling of the first amendment right to freedom of speech. The court,
however, found that judicial construction of the statute had narrowed its
application so that only speech and conduct not constitutionally protected
was proscribed; thus, the statute was allowed to stand as written.231 There-
fore, to avoid overbreadth and chilling effects upon speech, a valid harass-
ment statute should expressly exclude constitutionally protected speech.
232
In another New York case, People v. Lamb,233 the complainant had
pressed charges against a tavern owner alleging that he was repeatedly
annoyed and harassed by the defendant making excessive noise, littering
complainant's yard, and using abusive and obscene language. In denying a
motion to dismiss the information, the court held that these allegations fell
within the scope of the harassment statute, and that the statute was not
overbroad nor too vague to be capable of enforcement. 234 Rather, the
court decided that it was a question of fact to be decided at trial whether or
not the conduct complained of met the standards necessary to obtain a
conviction under the harassment statute.
235
The Pennsylvania case of Commonwealth v. Duncan236 also upheld the
validity of that state's harassment statute against an attack based on vague-
ness and overbreadth. Although there was a vigorous dissent to the court's
ultimate holding, 7 the finding of constitutionality was not questioned. The
court held the statute not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad because it
227. See text accompanying notes 177-185 supra.
228. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
229. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 220 (1875).
230. 75 Misc. 2d 616, 348 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1973), rev'd on other grounds, 35 N.Y.2d 803, 321
N.E.2d 550, 362 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1974).
231. 75 Misc. 2d at 618, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
232. See text accompanying notes 194-200 supra.
233. 86 Misc. 2d 1023, 384 N.Y.S.2d 929 (1976).
234. Id. at 1024-25, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 930.
235. Id. at 1025, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 930.
236. 239 Pa. Super. Ct. 539, 363 A.2d 803 (1976).
237. See text accompanying notes 214-223 supra.
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contained the following requirements: 238 (1) course of conduct or repeated
acts which would seriously offend the average person; (2) proof of specific
intent on the part of the accused; and (3) conduct of a nonlegitimate nature,
that is, not constitutionally protected. Specific intent may be an essential
element to the validity of this Pennsylvania statute239 due to its otherwise
vague wording as to the proscribed conduct. As discussed above, 2' if the
proscribed conduct is more carefully defined, specific intent is not an
essential element of the offense of harassment.
In light of these considerations, a harassment statute can be drafted for
California that is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. An inclusion
within the statute of a definition of "course of conduct" would ensure that
the statute is not held void for vagueness, 241 and an express exclusion of
constitutionally protected speech would eliminate the danger of over-
breadth.242
D. Punishment
The harassment statutes already enacted in seven states all classify the
crime of harassment as a misdemeanor or less serious crime, 243 and two
states impose only a fine and no imprisonment. 244 The most severe punish-
ment is imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year.
245
In California, crimes are classified as infractions, misdemeanors, or
felonies. 246 An infraction is not punishable by imprisonment, 247 and punish-
ment for a misdemeanor is imprisonment in the county jail for not more than
six months, or by a fine not over $500, or by both.248 By punishing the first
harassment conviction as an infraction, the nonserious, nonrepeating of-
fender would not be burdened with a serious criminal record but would be
sufficiently deterred from continuing the harassment. Moreover, this first
conviction as an infraction would serve as additional notice to the offender
that his or her conduct is indeed harassing the victim, and that he or she is
breaking the law.
For the crime of harassment, it would thus seem appropriate to have a
punishment scheme classifying the first conviction as an infraction, rising to
238. 239 Pa. Super. Ct. at 549, 363 A.2d at 808.
239. See note 215 supra.
240. See note 171 and accompanying text supra.
241. This is necessary because of the deletion of a specific intent requirement. See text
accompanying note 171 supra.
242. See note 74 and text accompanying note 232 supra.
243. ARK. STAT. ANN. §41-2909 (1975); COLO. REV. STAT. §18-9-111 (1973); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. §525.070 (Baldwin 1975); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, §506-A (1976); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§240.25 (McKinney 1967); OR. REV. STAT. §166.065 (1975); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §2709
(Purdon 1973).
244. Arkansas and Kentucky.
245. Maine.
246. CAL. PENAL CODE §16.
247. CAL. PENAL CODE §19c.
248. CAL. PENAL CODE §19.
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a misdemeanor upon a second or subsequent conviction involving the same
victim. Upon the commission of just one more act of harassment within the
same pattern and directed at the same victim, the offender could be charged
with a second or subsequent offense classified as a misdemeanor.
E. Proposed Harassment Statute
A criminal harassment statute embodying all of the elements necessary
for the statute's validity and effectiveness should be enacted in California.
The following statutory language is proposed:
249
Harassment.
(1) A person commits the crime of harassment if he or she
knowingly and willfully250 engages in a course of conduct directed
at a specific individual which seriously alarms, annoys, or harass-
es such individual and which serves no legitimate purpose.
(a) For purposes of this section, "course of conduct" means
a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of
time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose.
251
(b) The course of conduct must be such as would cause a
reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and
must actually cause the victim to suffer substantial emotional
distress.252
(c) For purposes of this section, constitutionally protected
speech and other activities serving a legitimate purpose are not
included within the meaning of "course of conduct."253
(2) If a peace officer acting in his or her official capacity is a
victim of harassment under this section, the officer who is the
victim shall not be the same officer making the arrest.25
4
249. Early in the 1977 California legislative session, a criminal harassment statute was
proposed as AB 1655. As introduced by Assemblywomen Egeland and Ryan, this bill simply
added a subsection to the disturbing the peace statute (CAL. PENAL CODE §415), which subsec-
tion consisted of language copied from New York's harassment statute (N.Y. PENAL LAW
§240.25(5) (McKinney 1967)). This author was consulted by Assemblywoman Egeland's office
to improve the language of the proposed statute. After meeting with representatives from the
Sacramento County District Attorney's office, the A.C.L.U., the Governor's office, and the
Senate Democratic Caucus, this author submitted a proposed criminal harassment statute to
Assemblywoman Egeland, similar in substance to the statute proposed in the text of this
comment. AB 1655 was amended on August 8, 1977, to incorporate this language, and the
proposed statute was removed from the disturbing the peace statute and instead was proposed
as an independently standing statute in the category of "Miscellaneous Crimes."
The bill was referred to the Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice for consideration. A
hearing before the committee was set for August 22, 1977, but was cancelled by Assemblywo-
man Egeland due to the crowded calendar of the committee on that date, which was the last
committee meeting of the 1977 Regular Session. Because AB 1655 had already been made into a
two-year bill because is had not passed out of one house before the deadline, this postponement
of the hearing date had no adverse effect upon the passage of the bill. Moreover, the postpone-
ment will allow the proponents of the bill an opportunity to respond to the analysis prepared by
the committee (See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, BILL ANALYSIS, A.B. 1655,
as amended August 8, 1977, hearing date August 22, 1977). The committee hearing has been
reset for January, 1978.
250. See text accompanying notes 167-170 supra.
251. See text accompanying notes 171-186 supra.
252. See text accompanying notes 187-193 supra.
253. See text accompanying notes 194-206 supra.
254. See text accompanying notes 207-213 supra.
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(3) For purposes of a second or subsequent offense involving
the same victim, a "course of conduct" need only consist of one
act which follows the same continuity of purpose established in
the offense which is the basis of the first conviction.2
5
(4) A first conviction for harassment shall be punishable as an
infraction, and a second or subsequent conviction involving the
same victim shall be punishable as a misdemeanorY
6
CONCLUSION
The type of conduct constituting harassment is sufficiently harmful to
warrant protection against it. Although a victim of harassment may bring
suit against the perpetrator for invasion of privacy or intentional infliction of
emotional distress, the tort remedies do not provide adequate protection for
the victim. Nor do the tort remedies prevent harassing conduct from
threatening the personal autonomy so essential within a society. The tort
remedy of damages is neither adequate to compensate the victim for the
harm suffered, nor will it affect the behavior of one determined to accom-
plish the purpose for which the harassing conduct is carried out. In addition,
an injunction will not be effective if the personal emotions involved'are so
strong as to be unaffected by a legal action. Even if the civil remedies were
effective, time and money would still be required to obtain such relief.
During this period, the trauma suffered by the victim due to the harassing
conduct goes unrelieved, and the victim is unable to obtain police protec-
tion.
Not only the victim, but society as a whole has an interest in the
curtailment of harassment. Harassment is an assault upon one's dignity and
a blow to individual freedom and independence. As such, harassment is
socially intolerable conduct in violation of the public interest, and should be
subject to prosecution in the interest of the people of the state. The most
practical and effective solution to the problem of harassment is a criminal
statute prohibiting such conduct. Through careful drafting, a statute can be
formulated that would effectively curtail conduct which seriously alarms,
annoys, or harasses another person. At the same time, safeguards can be
built into the statute to prevent abuse and to ensure that it is used for its
intended purpose. A precise definition of the proscribed conduct would
protect the statute against attack for vagueness or overbreadth.
A criminal statute would provide immediate relief to a victim of harass-
ment and would punish only those persons whose conduct is of a seemingly
criminal nature but is not now punishable in California because it does not
fit squarely into any of the existing criminal statutes. By narrowly defining
255. This provision is included to enable arrest and prosecution after just one more act,
rather than requiring another "course of conduct."
256. See text accompanying notes 243-248 supra.
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the type of conduct to be proscribed, no undue restrictions would be placed
on interpersonal behavior. A criminal harassment statute should be enacted
to protect the victim of harassment as well as to ameliorate the injury
reflected upon society. Only then will the problem of harassment have an
effective solution.
Linda M. Gunderson
